On February 24th, 2022, in defiance of international law and in disregard of appeals by various international bodies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Security Council (UNSC), Russia invaded Ukraine. Using its veto power to paralyze UNSC, and threatening the use of escalated measures against any states which might directly intervene, Russia easily batted away the weak diplomatic impediments to its invasion. The implicit declaration: Russia’s interests superseded any international treaties or customs which might impede them. It would appear realism had won the day: states, driven by the primary goal of strengthening themselves (even at the cost of other states), compelled by rational national interest, and unimpeded by the constraints of unenforceable international law, exist in a state of competitive anarchy with one another; peace is fragile, temporary, and maintained only by alliances and balances of power. Nor, would it seem, is the realist perspective limited only to the Russo-Ukrainian War. Modern history is punctuated with international conflicts which similarly attest to the failure of international law to govern states or the individuals within them. Human nature invades international relations with almost surprising insistence, manifesting itself at the international level as a kind of political animus dominandi—a desire to dominate.

Such a Nietzschean perspective is, however, based upon a flawed assumption of human nature and international relations, and consequently lacks both descriptive and axiomatic validity. Realism maintains a pessimistic view of human nature which is unalterably defined by its “will to power.” Since states are directed by self-interested humans, states must by necessity be self-interested as well. As John Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism suggests, states are “power-maximizers,” seeking security through power in a perpetually anarchic world. Here, however, realism’s descriptive power falls short. Although it may be noted that instances exist, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which states will overstep the limits of international law for national interest, it must similarly be acknowledged that in modern history there are many more such instances in which states respect international law. If the rule, then, is that states are “power maximizers,” there would appear to be strikingly more exceptions to it than if we assumed states were “cooperation maximizers.” Russia’s defiance of international norms strikes us as notable precisely because it is not normal. Since the establishment of the United Nations in the wake of the Second World War, and the proliferation of international law which has accompanied modern globalization, normative international relations are marked more consistently by reciprocity and cooperation than by war and conflict.

Realism further fails to adequately account for the existence and impact of international trade markets, the flow of private capital, and individual property rights, all of which indicate the existence of a sphere within international relations in which the state is not the principle actor. As Justin Rosenberg points out in his critique of realism, we are left with an inadequate understanding of international politics when we collapse economic, social, military, and political power into the restrictive “model of politico-military competition between states.”[1] The complexity of the transnational interactions of modern states are not reducible to state policy. States, far from being hindered by the loss of sovereignty in these areas, are benefitted by it, and it is increasingly only in dictatorial regimes that we witness state control of economic and social spheres. Thus, it may be said, realism better legitimates than guides or describes interventionist state policy.

Liberalism, by recognizing the complexity of international relations and the multiplicitous interests of its actors, better describes the modern international system. Although liberalism is often referred to as an “optimistic” view of the world, in contrast to the “pessimistic” perspective of realism, this is something of a misleading distinction. Rather, liberalism presupposes abuses of state power and, championing individual rights and freedoms, seeks to establish institutions which provide restraints on this power, whether those are domestic institutions (such as democratic elections and divisions of power) or international institutions (such as international law). The implicit assumptions in this perspective are both political and moral: self-interest will lead states and the individual actors to engage in power struggles against one another; but such power struggles, which tend to reduce rather than maximize individual liberty, are neither desirable nor inevitable.

This emphasis on non-state actors is central to liberalism. Whereas realism embraces the myopic assumption that the state is the primary actor, liberalism acknowledges the interconnectedness of economic, social, and political activity, both domestically and internationally—spheres within which both state and individual actors play a role. Free market enterprise, political trade policy, and the transnational flow of capital adeptly illustrate this multifaceted relationship, though such interactions between international and domestic, state and individual, are not limited to economics. International politics are influenced by social upheaval no less than social stability is influenced by international upheaval. As the international system is comprised not merely of states, but of individuals, corporations, and institutions, the individual motivations of these non-state actors must also remain a consideration of international relations. It is not merely sufficient to refer to national interests; rather, a multiplicity of individual and often competing interests are at constantly at play. Although spontaneous order guides the preponderance of such interactions through natural incentives to cooperate and reciprocate, organized institutions are nonetheless useful to arbitrate when competition—be it political, social, or economic—goes awry. 

This belief that liberalism better describes the international system than realism assumes the efficacy of international law. Efficacy, however, is not to be confused with infallibility. International law, such as it is, provides a buttress to support international relations, but a buttress alone cannot support a cathedral. Although international law is often effective, it is not alone sufficient for ensuring peaceful relations between states, nor for safeguarding the rights of individuals within those states. The absence of a supranational law enforcement mechanism means that the obligation for upholding and, if necessary, defending international law falls to the individual states which have consented to be bound by it. The expectation is not, therefore, utopian coexistence. Indeed, the existence of international courts presupposes the violation of international law. Rather, the expectation is that international institutions will be better able to protect individual rights and freedoms than leaving states to their own devices. International law creates, in effect, a guidebook for proper international relations, which states may consent to use. It cannot, however, coerce states to follow it. 

[1] Justin Rosenberg, “What’s the Matter With Realism?” Review of International Studies. Vol. 16, No. 4 (October 1990), 287. 

Sources

• McGlinchey, Stephen, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug. International Relations Theory. Ed. McGlinchey, Stephen, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug. Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017. 
• Orakhelashvili, Alexander. Akehurt’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 8th Ed. New York: Routledge, 2018.  
• Rosenberg, Justin. “What’s the Matter With Realism?” Review of International Studies. Vol. 16, No. 4 (October 1990): 285-303. 
• Snyder, Glenn H. “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security.” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002): 149-173.