Discussions around the consequences and causes of corruption have a long antecedent. As early as Plato’s Republic, impetuous Thrasymachus declares justice to be nothing more than the advantage of the stronger; justice is, in his mind, merely what benefits those in power, regardless of the consequences their actions have on those they rule over. In his quintessential gadfly-like manner, however, Socrates soon prompts Thrasymachus to admit that even rulers may make decisions that disadvantage their subjects, to the detriment of their state as a whole. Two millennia later, studies have proven Socrates true. Corruption, experienced by developed and developing countries alike, has been shown to have considerable and often severe consequences for development. Not only does corruption negatively impact economic development, but it also increases inequalities, supports organized criminal networks, and impedes social development. The question remains, however: what really causes corruption? Is it merely that some people, like Thrasymachus before them, truly believe that might makes right, or can corruption be empirically correlated to particular external determinants? 

Although numerous theories of causality have proliferated since corruption became a more prominent consideration with regard to development, little consensus has emerged on its precise underlying causes. Vito Tanzi, somewhat ironically, directly correlates corruption to factors associated with development and globalization: high taxes, increased spending, new regulations, international trade, privatization, and the economic changes experienced by developing countries. Indirect causes of corruption, according to Tanzi, includes poor quality bureaucracy, low public sector wages, ineffective penalties, poor institutional controls, and a lack of organizational transparency, and negative leadership examples. While aptly highlighting factors that foster an environment ripe for corruption, his analysis fails to specify a persuasive cause of corruption itself. 

Failure to differentiate between the factors contributing to corruption, which provide windows of opportunity for corruption to occur, and the causes of corruption itself, occurs frequently in literature on the subject. In his article on the subject, Gjalt de Graaf examines six of the primary groups of theories concerned with the causes of corruption, which can further be divided between those that analyze individual, societal, or organizational causes. The challenge is, de Graaf argues, that most theories fail to substantiate clear causality. Organizational culture theories, for example, posit that “a causal path from a certain culture—a certain group culture—leads to a certain mental state. And that mental state leads to corrupt behaviour.” What cannot be explained, however, is why these same organizational factors sometimes do not lead to corrupt behaviour. That is, why some individuals choose to engage in corrupt behaviour while others do not. This is similarly the case for theories that propose cultural or institutional causes for corruption. Why is it that these contexts corrupt some but not others?

In answer to this question, de Graaf utilizes Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of action, which links the various factors related to action into a mutually interconnected and interacting whole. Corruption therefore occurs because “[a] person with a certain habitus, and having certain dispositions and predispositions, is triggered into corruption.” In other words, “[w]hether an official becomes corrupt depends on his or her disposition to become corrupt. This is not to say that (societal or cultural) regularities are absent in the behavior of officials: there are social factors that work through the individual.” Corruption is not merely linked to a single isolated cause—such as weak institutional frameworks or monopolistic discretionary power— but recognizes the interconnectedness of individual, social, and organizational factors, all of which may work together to cause corruption. This theory is in some ways reminiscent of R. Fisman and M. Golden’s references to a “culture of corruption“—that is, a culture which constructs not merely societal and institutional systems conducive to corruption, but also nurtures individual dispositions towards corrupt behaviour. Although Bourdieu’s theory of action, like other theories of corruption, does not provide an entirely persuasive causal explanation for corruption, it nonetheless provides a helpful framework for better understanding the concomitant determinants of development across various levels. 

Corruption may be global, but individual impetuses for engaging in corrupt behaviour ultimately limit the possibility of emphatically establishing the true causes of corruption. While certain factors contribute to institutional environments in which corruption can emerge and thrive, corrupt behaviour is ultimately perpetuated by individuals, each with their own unique motivations. Furthermore, the causes of corruption differ between developed and developing countries—the former more likely to be individualistic in nature, and the latter more likely to be social, cultural, and institutional. As G. Caiden observes, “Just as there are many varieties of corrupt behavior, so there are multitudinous factors contributing to corruption.” Some corrupt actors, like Thrasymachus, simply believe that injustice is more profitable than justice. Others may engage in corrupt behaviour because they move and work within a context where corruption is the norm. In the end, one must fall back on the Judaeo-Christian presupposition of human nature: humans, being flawed, tend towards what is wrong. This is particularly the case where no cultural or institutional safeguards exist to deter that wrongdoing. Thus, corruption may in the simplest of terms be understood as a calculated and individually motivated crime of opportunity which exists because of the environments exist where injustice is more advantageous than justice, where opportunities to engage in profitable corruption abound, and where corruption is not the exception but the norm.