The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action introduced the quadripartite human rights formulation which has since become the authoritative aphorism when talking about human rights: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” This formula has assumed a presumptive quality, touted often and challenged little. Of the four parts, however, one appeared in neither the early drafts nor the final version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): indivisibility. The use of the term “indivisibility” in reference to human rights has a later antecedent—one linked not to robust human rights theory, but to the highly politicized rhetoric that marked UN General Assembly debates on the codification of human rights in international law during the 1950s and 1960s. Over time, indivisibility has become the watchword for proponents of economic, social, and cultural rights, who, in the spirit of the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran, argue that “[s]ince human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.” However, the mere repetition of a claim does not make it a truism, and the notion of indivisibility suffers from theoretical, judicial, and implementation shortcomings which undermine its descriptive power and may have a detrimental effect on the global advancement of human rights. 

Indivisibility gained prominence in the human rights arena during the UN General Assembly’s efforts to codify the principles of the UDHR in an international bill of rights. Early drafts envisaged a single, unified covenant which, like the UDHR, contained both politico-civil and socio-economic rights alongside one another. However, prolonged discussion concerning the distinct state obligations, legal enforceability, and implementation of these two categories of rights ultimately led to the creation of two separate covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The concept of indivisibility featured prominently in these debates, where it was used primarily as a rhetorical device by the proponents of a single covenant of rights who believed that dividing politico-civil rights from socio-economic rights would give priority to the former. This rhetoric centred around the indivisibility of the two categories of rights generally, rather than the indivisibility of individual rights themselves. The argument was that the two categories of rights should not be divided between two covenants, not that they were intrinsically inseparable. The question was one of hierarchy, not relationship. 

The concept of indivisibility has since evolved. Where it began “as a strong descriptive adjective relating to the fundamental unity of the rights in the Universal Declaration,” it has since acquired a more expansive definition implying existential inseparability. As the United Nations Population Fund puts it, indivisibility means that the “[d]enial of one right invariably impedes enjoyment of other rights.” This is clearly reflected in the aforementioned Proclamation of Tehran, which suggest not simply that politico-civil and socio-economic rights are interconnected, but that “the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible” (italics mine).Indivisibility has thus come to imply the inherent inseparability of human rights, such that no single right can be fully realized or enjoyed independently of the others. As Daniel J. Whelan observes, “If something is indivisible, dividing that thing renders it impotent.” Under this new understanding of indivisibility, if one human right is not fulfilled, all other rights become unattainable. 

Common to the preambles of both the ICCPR and ICESCR is the assertion that the “ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.” This is incontestable. Less incontestable, however, is the derivative assumption that these rights cannot exist independently of one another—that they are wholly indivisible. Consider, for example, that as a principle of democratic equality every individual—whether he is able to work or not—is free to go to the polls and vote. That he is equally as free to cast a vote for the candidate or party he think best able to help him acquire work or grant him social assistance is likewise assumed. His right to vote aids the fulfillment of his socio-economic self-determination. The reverse is not the case. Neither work or social security will grant an individual the right to vote in a State where political freedom does not already exist. The history of women’s suffrage bears clear testament to this fact. In a State where only civil and political rights exist, socio-economic rights may be acquired through the democratic process. Where only socio-economic rights exist, civil and political rights must be won through revolution. It is of no great irony that the Soviet Union was a primary advocate for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the International Covenant of Human Rights: the rights delineated in the ICESCR may, excepting only the Article 1 right to political self-determination, be upheld by a totalitarian regime.

This is not to impose a hierarchy of value on human rights. Adamant adherence to the notion of indivisibility, however, overlooks the fact that a natural hierarchy of implementation already exists. The full and simultaneous realization all rights is an impossibility. The reality of the limited fiscal, judicial, and administrative resources of a State was well understood by the drafters of the UDHR, who instead asserted that individuals and States shall “strive… to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures” (italics mine). Article 2(1) of the ICESCR closely echoes the UDHR, obligating States “to take steps… to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” By contrast, the concept of progressive realization appears nowhere in the ICCPR, which instead requires State parties to “respect” and “ensure” individuals’ civil and political rights (Art. 2(1)). State obligations differ according to the rights concerned, with the implicit assumption that some rights can—and will—be realized sooner than others. Although the realization of socio-economic rights will result in the more robust enjoyment of politico-civil rights, and vice versa, rights may nevertheless be implemented progressively. That some rights may naturally precede others and, even if only temporarily, exist independently of them, is incompatible with the evolving definition of indivisibility. Furthermore, “the rhetoric of indivisibility obscures the reality that the fulfillment of specific rights can be in conflict with one another.” An individual’s right to manifest his religion and belief may, for example, be limited by the principle of equal political, social, cultural, and economic rights of men and women. Far from being indivisible, the full enjoyment of certain rights and freedoms may lead to conflicts in actual practice, necessitating the imposition of reasonable limitations upon their enjoyment. 

The concept of indivisibility is also problematic when it comes to justiciability. Human rights law presupposes that rights may be individually violated, and that such violations may be reasonably adjudicated in a court of law. A legal framework underpinned by the notion of indivisibility—in which every right is a domino which topples all the others—is not functional.  At a certain point a toppled human rights domino must be examined and evaluated on its own merits, separate from the others which it might indirectly affect. As in the case of Aydin v. Turkey, an individual may seek justice because her government failed to provide an “effective remedy” for the torture she suffered at the hands of government agents, but it would be both untenable and absurd to suggest that the violation of these rights resulted in her impossibility to enjoy any other right. Justiciability necessitates clear delineation between rights. It must be possible to ask Has X’s right to effective remedy been violated? without being forced to ask whether her rights to life or marriage or social security have also been violated as a result. Although a violation of an individual’s right to effective remedy may also indicate a violation of her right as an individual before the law, since these rights are naturally interconnected, it does not create a sudden impediment of her ability to enjoy any other right. The literal application of the notion of indivisibility as it has come to be defined would not only undermine human rights law as it is now practiced, but would impede any reasonable adjudication on human rights violations at all. 

Indivisibility can exist in theory, but not in practice. The original application of the term to imply the inherent unity between politico-civil and socio-economic right has merits. Certainly the categorization of human rights into the two International Covenants of Human Rights should not be interpreted to imply a hierarchy of rights. However, indivisibility as it has since come to be used—to assert the inherent inseparability of individual rights, where all rights are impeded if one is denied—is illogical, unfeasible, and potentially harmful. Where the principles of interdependence and interconnection imply that the denial of one right may obstruct the enjoyment of others, indivisibility assumes that the denial of one right necessarily infringes on the enjoyment of all the others. Within such a framework there exists little or no space for the “progressive realization” of human rights, with staunch advocates of indivisibility being satisfied by nothing short of the “full implementation of all components of human rights”—a demand more likely to frustrate than inspire pragmatic approaches to human rights implementation. Nor can effective adjudication exist if the concept indivisibility is literally applied. Precision of language is necessary to ensure human rights are effectively promoted, respected, and defended. The notion of indivisibility, however, may be considered descriptively bankrupt, adding little or no meaning to the description of human rights that is not already denoted by the terms “interdependent” and “interconnected.” Instead, it only muddies already formidable human rights waters.